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a b s t r a c t
With the digitalization of electricity meters many previously solved security problems, such as
electricity theft, are reintroduced as IT related challenges which require modern detection schemes
based on data analysis, machine learning and forecasting. Here, we demonstrate a multidimensional
anomaly detection approach for the early detection of tampered with electricity meters by comparing
a set of multiple energy demand time series. Our method can complement and enhance existing
monitoring systems which usually only analyze a single time series. We aim to detect electricity
theft, which leads to noticeable outliers in our work. We present three data preprocessing methods to
produce outliers in case of energy theft and highlight the requirements and fine-tuning mechanisms
for the aggregation and comparison of multiple data sources. We show that our metric is robust against
multiple manipulated data sources, which is a concrete improvement to alternative outlier preserving
concepts to aggregate multiple data sources. With detection rates better than 90%, we demonstrate the
effectiveness of using several data sources simultaneously, that, when used individually, provide little
value in anomaly detection. Furthermore, we show that we can use different households as comparable
data sources, without clustering the households according to their similarity first.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
The success of renewable energy usage is fueling the power
grids most significant transformation seen in decades, from a
centrally controlled electricity supply towards an intelligent, de-
centralized power supply. However, as power grid components
become more connected, they also become more vulnerable to
cyber attacks, frauds, and software failures.
Many recent developments focus on cyber–physical security,
such as physical tampering detection, as well as traditional in-
formation security solutions, such as the encryption of certain
communication channels. However, information security cannot
cover the entire challenge of cyber threats, as such digital meters
can be vulnerable to software flaws and hardware malfunctions.
Illera et al. [1], demonstrated that smart meters installed in Spain
used strong symmetric encryption but stored a static encryption
key in a plain text file, which allows adversaries to artificially ma-
nipulate and tamper with the data and measurements of a smart
meters communication channel. For this reason, there is a high
interest in utilizing the fine-grained data and recent advances in
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machine learning to detect electricity theft and data manipulation
with data analysis and anomaly detection methods.
Here, we introduce such an anomaly detection scheme, which
inspects the power measurements of a smart meter to detect
electricity theft. In contrast to traditional anomaly detection ap-
proaches, which observe a single source over time to detect
tampering, our approach consults the expected energy demand
characteristics across similar data sources over time (in a matrix)
and can unveil otherwise unseen outliers.
Due to the daily pattern of energy load curves, the detec-
tion of relevant outliers by comparing different data sources
(e.g. electricity meters) or different data sets of one data source
(e.g. previous days) can be a challenging task. Our contribution is
to illustrate an entropy-inspired outlier preserving metric which
can be used to aggregate data, so that repeating patterns can be
removed. We showcase two scenarios to tamper with electricity
meter data. Furthermore, we introduce and validate requirements
on the input data and highlight cases in which our entropy-
inspired metric leads to a concrete improvement compared to
alternative methods aggregating different data sources.
In the remainder of this paper, we first present an overview of
our proposed framework and discuss three alternative input data,
derived from raw data, as well as the benefits and limitations
of using multiple data sources and our metric. Our experimental
validation showcases the manual optimization and fine-tuning
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of input data and an extensive evaluation of parameters that
influence the detection rate of our approach. We compare the
feasibility of our method which removes repeated pattern and an
alternative method which does not consider these patterns. Fur-
thermore, we demonstrate the advantage of our entropy-inspired
method with the juxtaposition of an alternative outlier preserving
aggregation method. In our final experiment, we compare our
approach with two alternative anomaly detection schemes based
on Naive Bayes and XMR charts.
2. Related work
Many European countries launched a conversion to the next
generation power grid to fully benefit from and address the
challenges associated with distributed energy generation. The
wide availability of high resolution electricity data at residential
level and rapid advancements in machine learning techniques,
brought in a number of related research questions ranging from
energy forecast to typical load profile classification, to support the
safety critical processes in the power grid. In the following, we
summarize the relationship between these topics, to smart grid
security and anomaly detection.
2.1. Smart grid
Early studies on energy demand, e.g. Bohi et al. [2], often
focus on energy forecast and corresponding modeling methods
with various inputs, such as weather data and socioeconomic
data. A new trend is to extract such data from energy demand
to monitor security and safety aspects of the smart grid. Previous
work go as far as identifying individual appliances, socioeconomic
data and personal behavior with the varying energy consumption
of electric appliances. E.g. Kleiminger et al. [3] used multivari-
ate methods and supervised learning to detect human presence.
Molina-Markham et al. [4] used density-based clustering and
supervised learning to identify private information about con-
sumers. Yohanis et al. [5] analyzed the effect of the number of
occupants and the size of dwellings on load curves. Price [6],
as well as Druckman et al. [7] were able to find income and
employment status of households. Carroll et al. [8] and Mclough-
lin et al. [9] correlated load curves to employment status and
presence of children. Kolter et al. [10] analyzed the relation
between demand and building properties, such as the number
of rooms and the building value. Beckel et al. [11] extracted the
number of occupants. Newing et al. [12] associated energy con-
sumption patterns with particular dwellings, income and number
of children.
2.2. Energy theft
Smart Grids are historically not designed with Internet se-
curity in mind, as mentioned by Jain et al. [13], but security
flaws can result in customer information leakage and a cascade of
inadvertent or deliberate failures, such as a massive blackout and
destruction of infrastructures as introduced by Metke et al. [14].
Recently, Westerhof [15] simulated the disastrous consequences
of a coordinated cyber-attack on photovoltaic systems, which
may lead to a national power outage. In a study of Dabrowski
et al. [16], IoT botnets use common devices, connected to the
Internet to selectively increase and decrease power consumption
which can lead to falling below the standard frequency and
ultimately to power outages. These reasons advanced the topic
to a rapidly growing research area, as several surveys [17–19]
show.
A particular active and challenging field in the area of smart
grid security is electricity theft.
The basic function of a smart meter is the measurement of the
energy consumption for billing, which is calculated by adding up
the mains voltage multiplied with the current drawn by active
devices. We can split the methods to tamper with meters in
intrusive methods inside the meter housing and non-intrusive
methods outside the meter. Common intrusive methods include
attaching electrically conductive objects to pass current away
from the measurement circuit, disconnecting the phase to inter-
rupt the measurement or exchanging the phase connection to
archive a negative measurement. Non-intrusive measurements
include the usage of strong magnets to temporary disable the
power supply of the meter. For this reason, billing companies are
interested in detecting energy theft by leveraging the fine-grained
smart meter data and machine learning. Many authors [20–22]
employed machine learning to classify consumption pattern and
load profiles in order to detect electricity theft. Cardenas et al.
[23] developed a game theoretic scheme between adversary and
billing company. Bandim et al. [24] proposed a central observer
to compare the total energy consumption with the reported con-
sumption of individuals. Salinas et al. [25] suggested a distributed
algorithm to compute the trustworthiness of each participant.
Spiric et al. [26] detected energy theft by monitoring the energy
consumption with XMR charts. In addition to the physical meth-
ods mentioned above, modern smart meters pose the additional
danger of sophisticated digital manipulation methods, which are
not covered in this paper. With digital access to measurements
and metering information as well as knowledge on the detection
method, the adversary could potentially aim for stealthy manipu-
lation scenarios such as mimicry attacks. However, such methods
are general limitations of anomaly detection systems and not
specific to energy theft, as introduced by Urbina et al. [27] and
Bouche et al. [28].
2.3. Anomaly detection
A potential method to unveil energy theft is anomaly detec-
tion. Anomalies are defined as deviations from the expected data,
rather than by predefined malicious data. Therefore, it is par-
ticularly suitable to detect previously unknown tampered with
data, which is difficult to describe in the volatile and highly
heterogeneous energy demand.
Since the initial scientific publication of Denning [29], the
popularity of anomaly detection in order to detect malicious
behavior is constantly increasing. The emergence of sensors with
processing and communication capabilities stimulated great in-
terests in anomaly detection on smart grid components. Several
surveys [30,31] show approaches for anomaly detection on sen-
sor networks. A few authors also focus on components of the
power grid, e.g. Braun et al. [32] used the minimum co-variance
determinant to detect faults in photo-voltaic arrays and Dienst et
al. [33] consults change-point analysis to observe the condition
of photo-voltaic power plants.
Similar to our approach, Mclaughlin et al. [34] developed the
anomaly detection scheme AMIDS, based on network data and
electricity data, in order to detect energy theft. AMIDS utilizes
electricity measurements together with a NIALM database to label
the amplitude changes in a time series and subsequently learns
them with the Naive Bayes algorithm.
Furthermore, Raciti et al. [35] explored smart meters embed-
ded with
anomaly detection to identify threats on cyber physical sys-
tems. Rossi et al. [36] proposed to take collective and contextual
anomalies into account to detect events such as over-voltages
and under-voltages. Mookiah et al. [37] introduced a graph-based
anomaly detection approach, where vertices represent smart
appliances and edges represent their usage, to detect anomalies
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in power usage. Yip et al. [38] presented an anomaly detection
scheme that adopts linear programming to detect energy theft
and reduce false positives by taking into consideration the impact
of technical losses and measurement noise. Fengming et al. [39]
detected anomalies, such as short circuit faults, by comparing a
time-series reconstructed by a recurrent neural network with the
original data. Andrysiak et al. [40] presented a solution to detect
energy theft with network traffic anomaly detection in critical
smart metering infrastructure. Zhou et al. [41] aimed to detect
outliers such as communication failures and voltage disturbances
by comparing multiple time series of voltage with a randomized
block coordinate descent algorithm.
Our anomaly detection approach utilizes an entropy-inspired
metric to model the expected energy demand of different data
sources. Entropy-inspired anomaly detection have been applied
in other areas such as healthcare by Richman et al. [42], biodi-
versity assessment by Vranken et al. [43], or network anomaly
detection by Wagner et al. [44], but not as a method to aggregate
different data sources.
3. Data and method
Multiple data sources or multiple data sets of one data source
are a valuable extension to an anomaly detection model as the
comparison to similar data can point out otherwise hidden out-
liers. However, even the differences between data sources often
show regular patterns and hence, manipulated electricity data
often leads to local outliers instead of easy to find global outliers.
The aggregation of data to a single time series is essential to re-
move these patterns and can significantly improve the detection
rate.
For our approach, we first define a data preprocessing method
which results in a less noisy and standardized time series of
values, which reflects the activity of electric appliances found in
the energy demand load curve and produces outliers in case of
tampering. We refer to these values, which are the input data for
the aggregation method, as ‘feature’ to separate them from the
‘metric’, which are the output of the aggregation method.
These features build the underlying statistical model and dis-
tinguish between regular and anomalous behavior. We introduce
three features, each aiming to characterize the activity of a load
curve. In the next step, each feature is analyzed with regard to a
comparable data, such as a previous day of the same household
or a household with similar energy consumption: the features
are aggregated by encoding their distribution to a normalized
floating point value with our so called entropy-inspired metric,
which preserves outliers in the distribution of input features. The
resulting time series can be combined with off-the-shelf forecast
algorithms, such as Holt–Winters, to remove the daily patterns by
subtracting the forecast. Now, a simple threshold can distinguish
benign and anomalous values. Fig. 1 shows the complete process
to build the normal model and subsequently detect anomalous
time windows. The left part illustrates the data at each step of
the process: the top shows the raw input of different sources
as line chart, the middle shows the derived features, whereas
each time window results in a stacked bar of all data sources,
the bottom shows the resulting entropy-inspired metric. The right
of our figure shows training and anomaly detection process with
corresponding parameter. While the computation of the metric
is equal for both, as last step the forecast model is subtracted
from the actual metric to remove the daily pattern. Now, a simple
threshold can classify benign and manipulated time windows.
In the following, we provide a comprehensive overview of all
steps in the method and discuss on their benefit, starting with
our choice of raw data and the derived features.
3.1. Features
The output of the data preprocessing produces an outlier in
case of manipulated electricity meter. As these data are inter-
mediate results and input for our entropy-inspired aggregation
method we call them feature to keep them apart from the output
of the aggregation, which is in the following called metric.
The efficient operation of the power grid depends critically
on monitoring the participants, which is accomplished by using
measurements collected from meters deployed throughout the
grid. Typically, measurements include the real, reactive, and ap-
parent power as well as phase volt measurements and current.
Monitoring the current and voltage is critical for many appli-
cations such as the fault monitoring and the early detection of
over-voltage or power line failures. The reactive and apparent
power need to be closely monitored and counterbalanced by
power grid operators to avoid unnecessary thermal line losses.
The mains frequency, which measures the balance of production
and consumption, helps to prevent overproduction that destroys
equipment and underproduction that can lead to blackouts. From
this perspective, the manipulation of each measurement can lead
to safety critical situations. However, in this work we focus on
the integrity of real power measurements, because the tampering
with real power, which depicts the amount of work performed by
an component, is easy and intuitive for an adversary attempting
billing fraud. Furthermore, the manipulation of power measure-
ments can be used as foundation for many other sophisticated
scenarios, such as a forged blackout and other scenarios requiring
multiple corrupted electricity meters, which are not in the scope
of this work.
A simplistic and straightforward approach to detect an unex-
pected energy demand is to classify the raw data measurement by
measurement. However, raw load curves are difficult to compare
because the aggregated and overlaying patterns of several compo-
nents can drastically change and pollute the appearance of a load
curve. To clearly distinguish legitimate and anomalous data, we
need to filter any unnecessary information, which would produce
the same output for different inputs, and derive features which
are less noisy and more resilient to changes. The regular activities
of a household, given by e.g. the number of residents, work hours,
and sleeping habits are easy to find and still more consistent than
raw data. Therefore, we propose to numerically characterize the
‘activity’ of a time period in a households energy demand. We
can see activity as an occurrence of a state change for one or
many appliances and quantify the number of visible operations.
Or we can see activity simply as the consumption above a certain
level, which excludes stand-by devices. As we neither need to
distinguish devices nor find the cause of any activity in order to
perform anomaly detection, a consistent behavior of the features
is sufficient for our purpose. We implement three features ac-
cording to the above criteria, which all estimate the amount of
state changes or consumption during a predefined time window
to summarize the activity: the number of high amplitude points
(f1), the number of amplitude changes (f2) and the number of
similar amplitudes in a row (f3). All three features are computed
by applying a binary classification on each measurement and
adding up the number of measurements with positive class. A
lower activity results in a higher score and hence an outlier in
case of a manipulated electricity meter. By counting the number
of measurements in a time window we always receive results
with a fixed range, which are easy to compare and to normalize.
Remark 1. Formally, consider a finite time series T = x1, x2,
. . . , xn, xi ∈ R+0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with n elements representing
energy demand. Then, each feature is a conditional sum over
T , formally a function f : T ↦→ N0 with a range [0, n], here
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Fig. 1. Workflow of the anomaly detection theme.
Fig. 2. Illustration of our feature extraction f1(top), f2(middle), f3(bottom).













[l(xi, ε) > δ] (1c)
The function l(xi, ε) returns the amount of neighboring measure-
ments in a row, that are equal to xi, if we round by ε, whereas
δ is a threshold for the number of neighbors. We define f1 and
f2 as less than, because we want a big number in case of energy
theft. However, this is only more intuitive for us and also works
the opposite way.
Fig. 2 illustrates our methods to extract features. The line
shows an artificial energy demand (y-axis) over time (x-axis),
whereas the points illustrate measurements in one of two classes
for ’High Amplitude’ (top), ’Amplitude Change’ (middle) or ’Sim-
ilar in a Row’ (bottom).
3.2. Dimensions
In the following, the most important characteristic of the
features is to provide distinctive and discriminating distributions.
Here, we point out how to efficiently utilize such a distribution
for anomaly detection.
Intuitively, energy demand is highly adaptive and ever chang-
ing. Due to this fact, a static absolute value or maximum dif-
ference that unveils tampering is difficult to design. We can
mitigate this concept drift by using a similar data, such as historic
data or spatially close and structurally identical components that
naturally adapt due to the similar conditions. We call these data
sources or data sets of a data source dimensions, because the
regular measurements of a smart meter are mathematically con-
sidered a finite time series T (as defined before). As such, the time
synchronous results ofm smart meters are a n×mmatrixM. Note
that, a dimension, in our definition, does not necessarily correspond
to a physical dimension, but anything that can construct a matrix
of comparable data (e.g. it would be possible to add a dimension
for: all single-family households, all households of a region, or all
Saturdays). For our experiments, we address a third dimension by
subdividing the time-axis of different meters in k periods of time
(1 day), which is useful because we expect the same pattern over
these periods. As a result, the dimensions in our matrix compare:
(a) Time: n measurements for adjacent times (traditional)
(b) Households: measurement at time i for m smart meters
(c) Dates: measurement at time i for k different periods of time
To demonstrate the utility of different dimensions, we can use
an example where a single dimension is insufficient for detection.
In this context, we can define the concept of anomalous as an
outlier different from the majority of compared data and assume
a n×m×k matrix M, with identical values x, with some of these
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⎡⎢⎣x111 · · · x1m1... . . . ...
xn11 · · · xnm1
⎤⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎣x112 · · · x1m2... . . . ...
xn12 · · · xnm2
⎤⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎣x11k · · · x1mk... . . . ...




By aiming to detect outliers different from the majority, we
can see that the result greatly depends upon the dimension:
comparing x111, x211, . . . , xn11 (in dimension ‘Time’) results in no
detection because all values are equally manipulated. Comparing
x111, x121, . . . , x1m1 (in dimension ‘Date’), half of the values are
manipulated and we cannot distinguish normal and manipu-
lated values. Comparing x111, x112, . . . , x11k (in dimension ‘House-
holds’) we can clearly see an outlier, because only x111 is different
from all other values. We can simplify the relation of dimen-
sions and detection rate by considering each dimension of the
matrix as individual anomaly detection approach. By assuming
that each dimension is statistically independent and used for





· pk(1 − p)n−k to compute the total probability for detec-
tion. Whereas P computes the cumulative probability that the
anomalous value is k times successfully detected in a total of
n dimensions, if each dimension has the same individual de-
tection rate of p. Fig. 3 visualizes the probability that at least
one dimension detects the manipulated data. Each line shows a
different probability for a correct classification of the individual
dimensions, whereas the x-axis shows the amount of trials. The
y-axis shows the cumulative probability for at least one correct
classification.
3.3. Entropy
The entropy is a convenient way to aggregate several values
without losing information on outliers. We aim to aggregate the
distribution of each dimension to a single value, so that we can
apply time series prediction and hence remove predictable pat-
terns. Our reasoning here is that similar data sources, such as two
spatially close and structurally identical photovoltaic cells or two
days of the same household, should result in similar volumes of
features, and hence a uniform distribution (or at least a consistent
pattern). A sudden shift of the distribution due to a significant
change of measurements is, according to this reasoning, an outlier
and unexpected.
Shannon [45] defined the entropy as ‘uncertainty’, which is
maximized when the outcomes of a random variable are equally
likely. A frequency distribution of equal outcomes corresponds to
a uniform distribution.
Remark 2. Formally, let X = x1, x2, . . . , xn, denote the frequen-
cies of outcomes from the random variable. Whereasm =
∑n
i=1 xi
implies the number of all experiments. Then, the entropy H(X ) is
defined by










1 We simplified the matrix notation of each row and column
x111, x121, · · · , x1m1 for space considerations.
Fig. 3. Binomial probability for different dimensions.
If we define 0 · log2(0) as zero, the entropy lies in a range of
[0, log2(n)], minimized if a single frequency differs from all others
and maximized if all occur equally often. For a better comparison,
we normalize the entropy to [0, 1] as follows:










We use the entropy not in a traditional sense but as a metric to
mathematically trace outliers in the distribution of features over
time. While our entropy-inspired metric may have characteristics
similar to Shannon’s entropy, we do not aim to proof that the
entropy is the only function fulfilling the requirement to pre-
serve outliers. The practical function as a metric, which encodes
distributions without losing information on outliers, is the most
important aspect for us.
The input for the entropy could principally be an artificial his-
togram, such as the relative volume of energy demand. However,
if the range of input values changes over time, the entropy is
difficult to compare with a previously computed entropy. There-
fore, the volume of each feature should have a fixed range.
Furthermore, the entropy is profoundly affected by the number
of possible outcomes, which means more input values (dimen-
sions) result in the entropy-inspired metric being less affected by
outliers.
Let us assume that the initial state is a uniform distribution
of a vector v = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n) of length n. It is reasonable that
a change (a) to v = (0, 0, 0, 1) is more visible than a change (b)
to v = (1/n−1, 1/n−1, . . . , 1/n−1, 0), because the sum of changes in
(a) is 2(n−1)/n, whereas the sum of changes in (b) is 2/n. According
to this reasoning, we can construct our method to detect one
of two situations using the entropy metric: detect few falsified
value which must be much bigger than the normal values, or
detect a majority of falsified values which must be much smaller
than normal values. Here, we prefer the first option in order to
detect anomalies early on and tolerate that visibility decreases
with increasing proportion of tampered values.
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Fig. 4. Entropy values from uniform distribution to heavily skewed distribution.
The Fig. 4 illustrates the entropy of a distribution from real
world data. On the x-axis of the plot, we can see six time win-
dows: (a) morning, (b) afternoon and (c) evening of sample one,
as well as (d) morning, (e) afternoon and (f) evening of sample
two with energy theft. In the upper stacked bar plot, each stack
(a–f) has twelve elements. Each element represents the size of
our feature (f1: Number of high amplitudes) for a different day
during the corresponding time window. The left side (a, b, c) with
normal energy demand is roughly uniformly distributed, whereas
the right side (d, e, f) with energy theft includes an outlier. The
bottom line diagram shows the corresponding entropy, which is
high for a uniform distribution and low for a skewed distribution
as in case of energy theft.
With the above characteristics of our metric, an anomaly is
revealed by very small entropy values. However, such anomalies
can also be detected by the outlier in the distribution of input
values. Hence, it is always possible to detect the same anomaly by
looking at the input values instead of the entropy. The entropy is
only a convenient way to aggregate several values without losing
this information (e.g. compare several households simultaneously
over time). The main motivation to aggregate the results is to
simultaneously apply off-the-shelf time series algorithms such as
Holt–Winters on several households or days, which is difficult
with a matrix representation. To apply the entropy horizontally
on the dimension ‘time’ is not suitable as it would mean to encode
an outlier which is already visible with other close values and
worsen the result.
4. Experimental evaluation
Load curves often mirror specifics of the power grid, which can
be hard to mathematically trace but for human operators with
expert knowledge easy to estimate (e.g. the expected effect of
energy theft, the normal difference of two regular load curves
at peak times or the probability of legitimate outliers on specific
days). In order to dynamically adjust the parameters according to
such specifics, we introduce some relevant statistical indicators
from a holistic data analytic viewpoint (without considering the
mechanics of the power grid, which are well known to operators).
It is possible to mimic these manual tuning rules for automation,
but the efficient automatized tuning, which is a topic in the realm
of optimization algorithms, is not within the scope of this paper.
In the following, we start with the introduction of our ex-
perimental data set and tampering methods. Then, we evaluate
the significance of our features over raw data and especially
consider the influence of our parameters to generate outliers in
case of electricity theft. We provide a in-depth analysis on how
the threshold ε, the window size, the number of dimensions and
the length of training data for a forecast algorithm affects our
result.
4.1. Data set and energy data tampering
In the recent past, several data sets, monitoring household
electricity and environmental parameters have been released
publicly. Researchers used these data set to prove the validity of
their work for real life settings. This study uses the Electricity
Consumption & Occupancy (ECO) data set provided by Beckel
et al. [46], which is a comprehensive data set for non-intrusive
load monitoring and occupancy detection research, offering indi-
vidual appliance and occupancy readings every second. The data
set offers real world power measurements of six houses over,
depending on the household, a period ranging from four to eight
month. The real power (W) values of smart meters are based
on the SML-protocol, which captures the mean-cycle-power. The
ECO data set provides, apart from declared exceptions, measure-
ments in Watts with 4 decimal places for a total length of one
year and for six different houses. For the purpose of this study,
measurements were aggregated with a resolution of five minutes,
as the fine grained resolution is neither necessary nor practically
feasible for real world setups. In this data resolution, the raw
values of the ECO data set are used as input data to compute
the features ’number of high amplitude points’ (f1), ’number of
amplitude changes’ (f2) or ’number of similar amplitudes in a
row’ (f3) for a time window of predefined length. This process
is repeated on each dimension, so that the different data sources
can be aggregated to the metric.
Note that in the following our experiments for dimension
‘Date’, always shows the ECO data of household 1 (June 2012 to
January 2013), while experiments for dimension ‘House’ utilizes
the data of all six households. In case of missing data we removed
the corresponding day from all households, which resulted in
approximately 120 days which are simultaneously available for
all households. For our experimental setup, we also utilize the
real world measurements from the ECO data set to artificially
construct cases of tampered with data. In order to motivate a
realistic scenario, we manipulate the data according to the tra-
ditional (physical) tampering methods introduced in the related
work section. Namely, aiming to bypass energy consumption
and slow down the measurement or stop the measured energy
consumption altogether. Such patterns are simple, but realistic
scenarios. We assume that the adversary cannot gain unlimited
digital access to the smart meter, and hence stealthy energy
theft attempts, such as mimicry attacks, which attempt to bypass
anomaly detection, are not in our scope.
For following experiments, we use two types of falsified de-
mand with different influence on the original data. Type 1 is the
original data with an arbitrary region, with a length of at least the
time window for a feature, replaced by 0 Watt and represents a
case where the smart meter is cut off for a certain time, whereas
type 2 is the original data divided by 5 and represents a case
where the smart meter is continuously manipulated to lower the
demand. The type 1 falsified data may sound statistically trivial
to detect, but regions without power also occur in legitimate load
curves (e.g. sleeping hours or working hours) and hence only
change the regular load patterns to a decreased activity.
D. Hock, M. Kappes and B. Ghita / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 21 (2020) 100290 7
Fig. 5. Features with ε = 200 W.
4.2. Parameter evaluation: Features
Here, we optimize ε, the threshold parameter defining which
measurements are classified as ‘activity’ for each feature. The
threshold can be used to define which deviations from the nor-
mal model of a load curve are still within our expectations and
must be found for each individual electricity meter. We start to
evaluate the correlation of our features for benign and tampered
load curves using different ε and subsequently introduce addi-
tional indicators on the detection quality of the features. Fig. 5
illustrates our features according to Section 3.1. The top plot ’raw
data’ shows one day of energy demand from the ECO data set,
the following plots present the classification of measurements
according to the condition of Eqs. (1a), (1b), (1c). The vertical
dotted lines visualize the length n of a period which is used to
compute the sum over all gray dots.
We proceed to assess the quality of ε in several steps: we want
to ensure that our features can distinguish anomalous and normal
data and can describe the relationship between two data sources.
Here, we measure this property of our features using the corre-
lation. Furthermore, as each feature is basically a classification of
individual measurements, we show whether the measurements
are evenly distributed over both classes, because a single-sided
classification does not contain any information. On top of that, we
illustrate whether measurements of different normal load curves
are equally classified or random, depending on ε. In the following,
we call these two properties regularity and certainty.
Our first objective is to see the influence of ε on the cor-
relation, which shows the amount of variation that cannot be
explained when the features of two load curves are compared.
For this experiment, we sliced the energy demand of a single day
to equally sized time windows (see Fig. 5) in order to compute
our features, which results in a vector of features v⃗ representing
energy demand.
Remark 3. A correlation of 1 indicates that time series v⃗1 reacts
at any time exactly like time series v⃗2, while a correlation close
to 0 means that the two curves are not related. A negative
correlation shows that v⃗1 and v⃗2 is horizontally or vertically
reversed. We are not interested in negative correlation, which
would roughly mean that v⃗1 shows energy production while v⃗2
shows energy consumption or that v⃗1 shows high consume in
the morning while v⃗2 shows high consumes in the evening. For
Fig. 6. Correlation of normal and anomalous load curves with ε.
this reason, we change the scale of the correlation (in Fig. 6)
to [0, 1], whereas 0 means different and 1 similar as follows:
ˆcorr = (corr(v⃗)+1)/2.
Here, we are interested on whether the features of a normal
load curve show higher correlation to the features of a normal
load curve than to a falsified load curve and evaluate the cor-
relation to falsified demand with different load pattern (type 1:
region replaced by 0 Watt) and decreased energy (type 2: region
divided by 5).
Fig. 6 presents the normalized correlation (y-axis) with differ-
ent ε (x-axis) for each feature (avg. 30 days). The black line plots
the ˆcorr of normal data, and should be maximized, whereas the
dotted lines each represent the comparison to tampered data, and
should be minimized. The plot ’Similar in a Row’ is not expected
to show a minimized correlation for type 2, because the pattern,
and hence measurements in a row, is unchanged through the
tampering method. In ’High Amplitude Points’, we can see that
ε < 50 W results in a ˆcorr of 0 while both other features work
with a small ε. This is of course coined to this specific household,
which consumes (due to the standby power of many appliances)
at least 50 Watt even without human activity. Next, we introduce
the computation of regularity and certainty for Fig. 7.
Remark 4. Naturally, R = f1(T )/n shows the ratio between {0, 1}
classifications. Let us define regularity as ratio approaching 0.5,
which can be normalized to range [0, 1], where 0 is one-sided
and 1 regular with Regularity = 1− |R−0.5|/0.5. Using the certainty,
we want to ensure that the classification is not random. Here, we
use the equation for our feature without the sum, which results
a binary time series T ′ = b1, b2, . . . , bn, bi ∈ B forall 1 ≤ i ≤ n
representing one day of energy demand. Let us define a matrix
M , where each of the m column is an instance of T ′ showing a
different day, then a row is ‘random’, if the {0, 1}-ratio of the m
instances is 0.5. We define certainty as the opposite of random,
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Fig. 7. Regularity and certainty with regards to ε.
Certainty = |RowRatio−0.5|/0.5 with a range [0, 1], where 0 means
random and 1 means that bi is equal for all columns.
In Fig. 7 (mean of 30 days), we show the relationship of
regularity and certainty (y-axis) for each feature. The x-axis shows
different thresholds ε in Watt, which are used to adjust the condi-
tional expression. As we only use normal data in this experiment
we expect that a good threshold would maximize the certainty.
A certainty of 1 would mean that the pattern of all 30 days is
exactly the same, which is good for anomaly detection because a
different load pattern would stand out. The regularity is only used
to identify errors, e.g. thresholds with a one-sided classification
which cannot distinguish between different days at all and for
this reason also results in a high certainty. For the anomaly
detection itself a low regularity would be perfectly fine. According
to this reasoning, we can see that the certainty starts with a high
value, but as the regularity at this point is zero, it only means
that the feature is unable to distinguish different load curves.
Next, we can see a negative peak for the certainty (approximately
for the same ε that maximizes the regularity), which should be
avoided, as zero certainty means the classification of all 30 days
was random. The two intersections of regularity and certainty are
a good compromise and show us where the explanatory power of
the feature is maximized. The result also confirms the estimation,
of the previous figure showing the correlation of normal and
anomalous load curves, which showed that ’Number of High
Amplitudes’ needs a high ε (for this household) while both other
features work with low thresholds. New to Fig. 7 is, that we can
now see that the feature ’Number of Amplitude Changes’ results
in an overall higher certainty, which means that the patterns of
this feature are more stable and therefore easier to forecast than
the other features.
Altogether, we conclude that ε can be adjusted, so that the
features react well to specific tampering methods or, if the tam-
pering method is unknown, to the energy demand of a certain
data source.
4.3. Parameter evaluation: Entropy
In our experiments, we demonstrated that, by using our fea-
tures, we can capture unexpected energy demand changes and
that the unexpected values appear as outlier in contrast to normal
data. We can maximize the change of the entropy using two
parameters: first, the window size of our feature, which is defined
by the amount of measurements in a window, and affects the
maximum difference of normal data and outlier. Second, the size
of the vector, which is defined by the number of dimensions, and
affects the proportion of normal and falsified values in the dis-
tribution. Here, we examine these two parameter in conjunction
with the entropy.
The window size, which is used to compute a feature, defines
the amount of classified measurements and hence the range of
the feature. In Fig. 8(a), we show the window size (x-axis) and
corresponding avg. feature volume (y-axis) of normal data (mean
of 24 days). While the avg. volume is consistent about half of
the window size, we can see that the standard deviation slowly
decreases with the window size (total range) of the feature.
However, a bigger window size can be a disadvantage, because
it will only appear as anomalous if the majority of measurements
within this window are falsified. Fig. 8(b), shows the average
entropy for six normal samples (black) and one of six samples
falsified (dotted) for dimension ‘household’ and ‘days’. Note that,
in our paper falsified data should always result in an outlier and
hence, a small entropy. We can see here, that the distance of the
entropy with normal and anomalous data is increasing with the
window size of the feature. The avg. entropy is not expected to
be a particular good indicator, because not every time window is
expected to be uniformly distributed, and hence the avg. entropy
is influenced by regular daily pattern. However, the fact that small
window size can result in a completely wrong model, where the
avg. entropy of tampered data is greater than the entropy of
normal data, indicate that the entropy of such time windows may
be hard to predict.
The second parameter we need to address is the ’dimension
size’, which is of paramount importance to our entropy-inspired
metric, because it reflects the necessary distance to other (nor-
mal) values in order to appear as outlier. In Section 3.3, we
introduced the theoretical concept of the dimensions and demon-
strated the effect of energy theft (outlier), which resulted in a
smaller entropy. It may sound intuitive that smaller dimension
sizes are better, because in a vector of smaller length, individual
false values appear proportionally bigger and result in a more
skewed distribution which affects the entropy. But smaller vec-
tors are often heavily influenced by the standard deviation and
appear anomalous even without falsified data.
Fig. 9 illustrates this effect by the distribution (bar plot) and
entropy (line chart) of our feature over different days in 4 h
windows (48 measurements per window) for two different di-
mension sizes (top: 4 days; bottom: 14 days). Similar to Fig. 4 in
the introduction of entropy, each stack of the bar plot shows the
distribution of our feature across several days. If one element of
the stack is bigger than all others (as in case of energy theft), this
outlier results in a smaller entropy.
The left figures show regular days while the middle figures
show a sample with one day falsified (type 1). In the upper
figures, we can see the potential problem with a too small dimen-
sion size: Due to the high standard deviation, some time windows
of the normal data include legitimate outliers (e.g. left upper
bar plot - stacked bar nr. 5). These legitimate outliers cannot be
distinguished from energy theft. Note that, we had to look for a
specific day with irregular load curve in our data set to demonstrate
this.
According to this reasoning, the optimal dimension size is the
smallest possible size, where we can still consistently distinguish
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Fig. 8. Effect of the feature window size on the entropy.
Fig. 9. Distribution and entropy for vectors of size of 4 and 14.
Fig. 10. AUC for dimension sizes.
the entropy of anomalous and normal values. We evaluate this
using the Area under the Curve of a ROC Curve. A ROC Curve
shows the sensitivity (true positive rate) and the specificity (true
negative rate) for any possible threshold to divide benign and
anomalous entropy values. The accuracy of a method can be
defined by the area under the curve (AUC). A good method
can maximize both sensitivity and specificity, which results in a
big area under the curve, while a random method results in a
diagonal line and an AUC of 0.5. In Fig. 10, we can see the area
under the curve for different dimension sizes (each showing the
AUC for 240 classifications = 40 days), which shows no significant
improvement with dimension sizes greater six (vertical dotted
line). Note that, the AUC still improves with more dimensions if we
include the prediction. We still used a dimension size of six due to
practical reasons.
4.4. Parameter evaluation: Prediction
In the previous section, we evaluated the influence of feature
window size and dimension sizes on the expected difference
of the entropy for normal and anomalous energy demand. We
found that, even in case of good conditions the difference of
benign and tampered data is often smaller than the expected
standard deviation of the entropy, which is due to the regular
patterns. Hence, in order to detect anomalies more reliably, we
need to remove the usual time-depending patterns carried by our
features and the resulting entropy. In the following, we use a time
series prediction algorithm to forecast the expected entropy. By
subtracting the predicted from the actual value we aim to receive
a straight line, without time-depended pattern, which is high for
normal and low for falsified data.
For our experiments, we used Holt–Winters, which models the
level, seasonality and slope of a time series using training data. A
small amount of training data is preferable as privacy concerns
and performance may not allow huge sets of historic data for ex
post analysis. However, small amounts of training data can lead
to over-fitting: while the Holt–Winters model perfectly fits the
training data, the actual data would show unpredicted patterns
different from the learned data and not match the model.
The length of training data does depend upon previous param-
eters, such as the window size and dimension, as those parameter
define the frequency of regular pattern. Here, we chose the root
mean square error (RMSE) between model and actual data as a
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Fig. 11. RMSE for different lengths of training data.
Table 1
RMSE for each feature and dimension.
H1 DM p-value
f1 < f2 7.7143 4.012e−13
f1 < f3 7.635 6.393e−13
f3 < f2 3.6171 0.0001934
rough estimation of the model quality. The RMSE, which is the
square root of the variance of the residuals, shows how close the
model fits to the actual data. It is in the same unit as the training
data, the normalized entropy with a range [0, 1], which means we
can expect an RMSE of [-1,1]. Values close to zero indicate better
fit, as zero means that we do not have any variance between
training data and model.
Fig. 11 shows boxplots for the RMSE, ranging from 30 entropy
values (5 days) to 420 values (70 days) as training data (avg. of
300 trials). We used the feature ’High Amplitude’ on dimension
‘Date’ with a window size of 48 power measurements (4 h) and a
dimension size of 6 to compute the entropy. In this specific case,
the RMSE is minimized at 180 entropy values, which is about a
month.
In Table 1, we aim to compare our introduced features to find
out which feature is in general better to predict. For this purpose,
we set up a Diebold–Mariano test, which is using the forecast
error to compare the accuracy of two forecasts with a so called
DM statistic. The DM statistic is used to compute a hypothesis test
with the null hypothesis that both forecasts are of equal accuracy,
and the alternative hypothesis that one method has greater ac-
curacy. A small p-value indicates strong evidence against the null
hypothesis, which means that the null hypothesis can be rejected
and the alternative hypothesis is true. A large p-value indicates
weak evidence against the null hypothesis, which means that no
conclusion can be drawn. Table 1 shows the resulting hypothesis
test for the number of high amplitude points (f1), the number of
amplitude changes (f2) and the number of similar amplitudes in
a row (f3), with the same parameters that were used in Fig. 11.
5. Detection rate and performance
We claim that the advantage of our entropy metric is espe-
cially the ability to keep information on outliers after aggregating
several values, whereas the aggregate value can be utilized to
apply time series prediction. For this reason, we first compare
our metric with an alternative metric and evaluate the value
of the time series prediction. In the second part of this section,
we compare our complete anomaly detection scheme with other
state of the art approaches.
5.1. Performance of the metric
Here, we evaluate if the time series prediction increases our
detection rate in contrast to the same method without prediction.
Furthermore, we check if the entropy is really a good method
to aggregate data while preserving outlier. As an alternative to
the entropy, we compute the maximum distance to the mean-
value of a row: in contrast to the entropy, this value is large in
case of big outliers and small if all values are uniform distributed
– we call this method D2M. Given is, for both methods (D2M
and Entropy), a time series consisting of individual values (our
metric), which summarize several dimensions over a predefined
time window. Each method is evaluated in combination with
Holt–Winters (a) and without (b). The decision algorithm for both
methods differs slightly: for (a), a value is anomalous if the metric
is exceeds a threshold. For (b), a value is anomalous if the actual
metric minus prediction exceeds a threshold.
We evaluate the AUC of both methods with a so called boot-
strap test. Here, the AUC is repeatedly (N = 2000) computed
with the original inputs for the ROC curve re-sampled, which
approximately follows a normal distribution used to perform a
hypothesis test. The null hypothesis is that the true difference
between both AUC is zero and the alternative hypothesis is that
method one performs better than method two. A small p-value
shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Table 2, at the
end of the paper, shows the result of this experiment for each
feature, the number of high amplitude points (f1), the number of
amplitude changes (f2) and the number of similar amplitudes in a
row (f3), with dimension size 6 and a window size of 48. Further-
more, the table shows the AUC for one, two or three corrupted
samples (days). Note that, a majority of falsified samples cannot
be detected per definition. To train Holt–Winters, we predicted 6
entropy values (1 day) from the last 60 entropy values ( 2 month).
Each experiment was repeated (over a time of 4 month) to get
120 prediction values, which are used to construct the AUC of
a ROC Curve. For simplicity, we interpret the AUC as accuracy,
where 0.5 is random and 1 is perfect. In the results we can see,
that the time series prediction significantly improves the results
for both metrics, the entropy and D2M. Although our proposed
method, the entropy-inspired metric in combination with time
series prediction, results in acceptable detection rates mostly over
90%, which can compete with the other function, it only performs
better if we have several outliers in the distribution – which
means that e.g. the current day and day before show energy theft.
A case with several outliers is difficult to detect for alternative
function.
The lower part of the table shows the same results for dimen-
sion ‘House’. Unfortunately, due to the different load pattern in
the dimension ‘House’, two of our three proposed features were
not working well enough for a practical usage. For features ’High
Amplitude’ and ’Similar in a Row’, we were not able to optimize
the parameter ε well enough to get an approximately uniform
or otherwise predictable pattern each household. However, the
feature ’Amplitude Changes’ (f2), was resilient to these different
load patterns and performed very well (This is not surprising,
because the experiments in previous sections already pointed
out that the ˆcorr and RMSE perform best for feature ’Amplitude
Changes’).
The results for type 2 falsified data in Table 3 are similar. We
expected that some features react better to tampering on the
amplitude and others on changed load patterns, but that was not
the case. All features react very well on changed load patterns
(type 1) and worse if the amplitude not affects load patterns
(type 2). ’Amplitude Changes’ performed well, while both other
features did not detect energy theft in this case and can only
work if the load patterns of the data sources are very similar.
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Table 2
AUC: type 1 falsified.
Dimension: Date
f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
1 of 6
Ent+TS 0.953 0.951 0.938 Ent 0.76 0.684 0.661
D2M+TS 1 0.998 0.938 D2M 0.973 0.854 0.761
p-value 0.014 0.00607 0.99 p-value 4.1e−09 5.98e−10 0.000323
2 of 6
Ent+TS 0.942 0.981 0.907 Ent 0.767 0.771 0.624
D2M+TS 0.893 0.921 0.742 D2M 0.626 0.675 0.523
p-value 0.0547 0.0229 5.4e−06 p-value 2.8e−05 7.37e−08 0.333
3 of 6
Ent+TS 0.853 0.975 0.822 Ent 0.646 0.756 0.557
D2M+TS 0.621 0.853 0.518 D2M 0.657 0.587 0.672
p-value 1.31e−07 0.00308 3.6e−11 p-value 0.911 1.13e−12 0.251
Dimension: House
f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
1 of 6
Ent+TS 0.456 0.87 0.591 Ent 0.68 0.83 0.507
D2M+TS 0.689 0.926 0.669 D2M 0.461 0.94 0.633
p-value 0.0173 0.00105 0.103 p-value 1.74e−08 0.000145 0.206
2 of 6
Ent+TS 0.561 0.956 0.609 Ent 0.729 0.897 0.707
D2M+TS 0.629 0.956 0.531 D2M 0.818 0.894 0.577
p-value 0.127 0.944 0.0876 p-value 0.00223 0.894 0.00163
3 of 6
Ent+TS 0.672 0.876 0.682 Ent 0.851 0.815 0.76
D2M+TS 0.758 0.829 0.589 D2M 0.927 0.731 0.644
p-value 0.0368 0.0679 0.0137 p-value 0.0029 0.00103 0.00129
Table 3
AUC: type 2 falsified.
Dimension: Date
f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
1 of 6
Ent+TS 0.912 0.792 0.819 Ent 0.73 0.508 0.497
D2M+TS 0.998 0.852 0.838 D2M 0.969 0.654 0.556
p-value 0.000932 0.0713 0.637 p-value 6.47e−10 2.04e−05 0.0272
2 of 6
Ent+TS 0.939 0.879 0.673 Ent 0.749 0.378 0.449
D2M+TS 0.936 0.846 0.584 D2M 0.645 0.404 0.601
p-value 0.857 0.386 0.0128 p-value 0.00204 0.139 0.14
3 of 6
Ent+TS 0.847 0.843 0.65 Ent 0.644 0.607 0.4
D2M+TS 0.686 0.797 0.545 D2M 0.629 0.501 0.677
p-value 8.4e−05 0.102 0.294 p-value 0.874 0.319 0.00517
Dimension: House
f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
1 of 6
Ent+TS 0.456 0.87 0.591 Ent 0.68 0.83 0.507
D2M+TS 0.689 0.926 0.669 D2M 0.461 0.94 0.633
p-value 0.0173 0.00122 0.102 p-value 1.47e−08 7.89e−05 0.206
2 of 6
Ent+TS 0.561 0.956 0.609 Ent 0.729 0.897 0.707
D2M+TS 0.629 0.956 0.531 D2M 0.818 0.894 0.577
p-value 0.126 0.944 0.0701 p-value 0.00165 0.895 0.00127
3 of 6
Ent+TS 0.672 0.876 0.682 Ent 0.851 0.815 0.76
D2M+TS 0.758 0.829 0.589 D2M 0.927 0.731 0.644
p-value 0.0327 0.0755 0.0153 p-value 0.00274 0.000817 0.0016
We believe that the performance may be further increased by
clustering similar load curves (in order to reduce the complexity
of daily patterns) – which is not in the scope of this work.
The feature ’Amplitude Changes’ showed results without clus-
tering households according to their similarity and performed
well solely because the pattern of each individual house was
consistent enough. A generalization to other data sets is difficult,
but we showed that our concept works on the condition that
we find a feature with consistent pattern on each data source,
which can generate outliers in case of manipulated data, and
showed methods for parameter optimization to ensure that these
conditions are adhered.
5.2. Performance of the detection scheme
Here we introduce a final comparison of our scheme with
two other state of the art anomaly detection methods on energy
demand, namely a method inspired by AMIDS from Mclaughlin
et al. [47], which models the energy consumption behavior of a
household using Naive Bayes, and a method based on XMR charts
from Spiric et al. [26]. Mclaughlin’s original article utilizes so-
called Non Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) profiles
to associate each on/off amplitude in a households energy load
curve to a certain appliance. The three resulting vectors with am-
plitudes, appliance names and on/off operations are used as input
for the supervised learning of the Naive Bayes algorithm, which
computes the probability for energy theft for each data point. In
contrast to our previous method, AMIDS has a strict requirement
for high data resolution. If the amplitudes of individual devices
are not visible, the detection rate is highly decreased. For our
experiment, we had to simplify Mclaughlin’s method, because the
setup of a suitable NIALM database is beyond our scope. Note that,
Mclaughlin evaluated his method with an energy demand simu-
lation, where the mapping of appliances to predefined profiles
is generally easier. Here, we use a simple clustering algorithm
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Fig. 12. Overview of anomaly detection methods.
instead of an elaborated, hand-labeled NIALM database. Hence,
we assume that the most frequent amplitudes (as arranged by the
cluster centers) correspond to the amplitudes of different devices.
One of the limitations of such a method is that appliances with
similar amplitude and appliances used together cannot be rec-
ognized as individual device. Our experiments indicate that the
results are still consistent enough for anomaly detection since we
can get a detection rate similar to Mclaughlin’s. However, it may
be possible to further increase the detection rate of this method
by using a better NIALM algorithm and higher resolution data.
Spiric’s fraud detection is based on monitoring the ’random com-
ponent’ of the energy demand, which means that the raw input
data is decomposed into a seasonal component, trend component
and random component (e.g. by using a moving average time
series decomposition algorithm). In order to define the threshold
for energy theft, Spiric utilizes a so called XMR chart, which
computes an upper and lower limit using the mean moving range.
Note that, the threshold of the XMR chart is not relevant for our
results, because we use the AUC as metric (see Section 5.1). The
AUC computes the result for any possible threshold, which means
our results of Spiric’s method may be slightly better than with a
fixed threshold.
Fig. 12 shows an overview of these methods: The top plot
shows the raw input data with four hours of energy theft around
0:00 pm. Next we see our own method, which computes the
entropy (black line) and the Holt Winters prediction of the ex-
pected entropy (dashed line) as a lower threshold. Here, energy
theft results in a small entropy. The third plot shows Mclaughlin’s
method, which is using a time series of amplitudes as input data
and assigns a probability for energy theft, which is the output of
Naive Bayes, to each measurement. Here, energy theft results in a
high probability. The bottom plot shows the XMR chart with the
random component of time-series decomposition as input, which
detects energy theft with a lower threshold (dashed line). Here,
energy theft results in a small or negative number relative to the
mean of the random component.
Note that, in order to compare these different methods, we
had to accept some limitations. E.g. it may be possible that,
Fig. 13. AUC depending on the amount of energy theft.
Table 4
AUC: type 1 falsified.
AUC AUC AUC
EntTS 0.965 EntTS 0.965 Naive 0.962
Naive 0.962 XMR 0.972 XMR 0.972
p-value 0.859 p-value 0.712 p-value 0.475
especially the Naive Bayes method, can be improved with higher
resolution data, because the edges of on/off operations are more
visible. Furthermore, it may be possible to optimize the lengths
of input data, e.g. the amount of training data or length of the ex-
pected seasonality for the decomposition algorithm. For the Naive
Bayes we used the previous day as training data, because using
more training data worsened the results. For the decomposition,
we used the default setting of one day seasonality.
Since our own method has a low resolution output data, we
had to aggregate the output of both other methods to the same
resolution in order to compute a consistent AUC. Both methods
utilize only a single source of input data, and hence it is not
possible to check the results of multiple compromised sources,
which is one of the strong points of our own algorithm. Since
the previous section already contains a detailed evaluation of our
own method (see Table 2), we only conducted this experiment
for the feature ’Amplitude Changes’.
Fig. 13 shows the results for different amounts of energy theft.
Each algorithm aimed to detect one day of energy theft on ECO
data household 1 in August. The plot shows the mean of 15
experiments. Note that, the output of Naive Bayes still has a lot
of variance because the result depends on the random cluster
centers used to determine the appliances. The x-axis shows the
AUC and the y-axis shows the amount of power subtracted from
the original energy demand. We can see here, that Spiric’s method
is especially good at detecting smaller amounts of energy theft.
In Table 4, we perform the same bootstrap test as in section
Section 5.1 with the alternative hypothesis that the accuracy of
both methods is different. However, for the type 1 energy theft,
we cannot clearly reject the null hypothesis that all methods
perform equally good, as all methods have a high accuracy. As
our method is generally intended to use additional data sources
which are not considered in the other two methods, we believe
that these three methods should be used together to complement
each other.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we showcased anomaly detection in different
dimensions, which can unveil, otherwise hidden, anomalous data
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if the majority of data in a single source is compromised. The
prerequisite to utilize multiple dimensions is an outlier produc-
ing feature comparable with other data sources as well as an
aggregation method, which preserves these outliers, to remove
repeating patterns. We showed three such features and a system-
atic approach to fine-tune and adjust them, which significantly
affects the detection rate. We demonstrated that high level in-
formation, such as the ‘activity’, can be utilized to normalize
data to a fixed range and fine-tune the feature to the specific
‘normal’ characteristics of a data source. For the fine-tuning, we
illustrated how to find an optimal threshold for each feature, to
distinguish normal and falsified data. Next, we showed how to
find the optimal window size for each feature, to minimize the
standard deviation of normal data. Furthermore, we evaluated
the influence of the number of data sources, so that, after the
aggregation, falsified data still produces outliers which are greater
than the standard deviation of normal data. In order to remove
the repeating pattern from the aggregated data, we demonstrated
how to find the optimal length of training data to maximize the
predictability of the metric. Our approach of extensive parameter
tuning, to adapt the feature to the specifics of a data source and a
certain malicious activity, may be seen as limitation. However, we
prioritized examination of the statistical influence of parameters
over automation, because we argue that anomaly detection can
only work with a solid understanding of the underlying data. A
limitation specific to our anomaly detection method is the low
output resolution, which was required to reduce the standard
deviation of the feature. Colloquially speaking, it means that
the majority of the electricity in this time window must be
manipulated for a detection.
For our two scenarios of energy theft, we had detection rates
above 90%, whereas the number of amplitude changes ≥ ε
performed especially well. We were able to detected tampered
data even by utilizing different households, which were not
clustered according to their similarity, as data source. Remov-
ing daily patterns with Holt–Winters significantly improved the
detection rate from about 75% to above 90%. Apart from the
entropy-inspired metric, other aggregate methods may work as
well, but our entropy-inspired metric is especially robust in
presence of multiple outliers. The detection rate of the alterna-
tive aggregation method (D2M) decreased up to 10% for each
additional compromised data source, while the detection rate
of the entropy-inspired metric did not significantly drop with
up to half of all data sources compromised. Sophisticated and
stealthy tampering methods, were not analyzed in this work, as
the detection of data mimicking attacks is a well known challenge
and inherent limitation of anomaly detection and beyond our
scope. As future prospects, we suppose to evaluate the usage of
additional measurements, which are correlated to the power, to
complicate the construction of such legitimate looking false data.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to discuss the selection ap-
proach of data sources under different conditions, e.g. depending
on the similarity of data sources.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
to influence the work reported in this paper.
Funding
This work was supported by the German Federal Ministry
for Economic Affairs and Energy under the Central Innovation
Programme for SMEs (ZIM) Grant No. ZF4131804HB8.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.segan.2019.100290.
References
[1] A. Illera, J. Vidal, Lights Off! the Darkness of the Smart Meters, BlackHat
Europe, 2014.
[2] D.R. Bohi, M.B. Zimmerman, An update on econometric studies of energy
demand behavior, Annu. Rev. Energy 9 (1) (1984) 105–154.
[3] W. Kleiminger, C. Beckel, S. Santini, Household occupancy monitoring
using electricity meters, in: Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International
Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing, ACM, 2015, pp.
975–986.
[4] A. Molina-Markham, P. Shenoy, K. Fu, E. Cecchet, D. Irwin, Private memoirs
of a smart meter, in: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Embedded
Sensing Systems for Energy-Efficiency in Building, ACM, 2010, pp. 61–66.
[5] Y.G. Yohanis, J.D. Mondol, A. Wright, B. Norton, Real-life energy use in the
UK: How occupancy and dwelling characteristics affect domestic electricity
use, Energy Build. 40 (6) (2008) 1053–1059.
[6] P. Price, Methods for Analyzing Electric Load Shape and its Variability,
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2010.
[7] A. Druckman, T. Jackson, Household energy consumption in the uk: A
highly geographically and socio-economically disaggregated model, Energy
Policy 36 (8) (2008) 3177–3192.
[8] J. Carroll, S. Lyons, E. Denny, Reducing household electricity demand
through smart metering: The role of improved information about energy
saving, Energy Econ. 45 (2014) 234–243.
[9] F. Mcloughlin, A. Duffy, M. Conlon, Characterising domestic electricity
consumption patterns by dwelling and occupant socio-economic variables:
An irish case study, Energy Build. 48 (2011) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
enbuild.2012.01.037.
[10] J. Kolter, J. Ferreira, A large-scale study on predicting and contextualizing
building energy usage, in: Proceedings of the National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2, 2011, pp. 1–8.
[11] C. Beckel, L. Sadamori, S. Santini, Automatic socio-economic classification
of households using electricity consumption data, in: Proceedings of the
Fourth International Conference on Future Energy Systems, ACM, 2013, pp.
75–86.
[12] A. Newing, B. Anderson, A. Bahaj, P. James, The role of digital trace data
in supporting the collection of population statistics–the case for smart
metered electricity consumption data, Popul. Space Place 22 (8) (2016)
849–863.
[13] P. Jain, P. Tripathi, Scada security: a review and enhancement for dnp3
based systems, CSI Trans. ICT 1 (4) (2013) 301–308.
[14] A.R. Metke, R.L. Ekl, Smart grid security technology, in: Innovative Smart
Grid Technologies, Vol. 2010, ISGT, IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–7.
[15] W. Westerhof, Horus scenario - exploiting a weak spot in the power grid,
2017, URL https://horusscenario.com/.
[16] A. Dabrowski, J. Ullrich, E.R. Weippl, Grid shock: Coordinated load-
changing attacks on power grids: The non-smart power grid is vulnerable
to cyber attacks as well, in: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference, ACM, 2017, pp. 303–314.
[17] W. Wang, Z. Lu, Cyber security in the smart grid: Survey and challenges,
Comput. Netw. 57 (5) (2013) 1344–1371.
[18] V. Delgado-Gomes, J.F. Martins, C. Lima, P.N. Borza, Smart grid security is-
sues, in: Compatibility and Power Electronics (CPE), 2015 9th International
Conference on, IEEE, 2015, pp. 534–538.
[19] J. Anu, R. Agrawal, C. Seay, S. Bhattacharya, Smart grid security risks, in:
Information Technology-New Generations (ITNG), 2015 12th International
Conference on, IEEE, 2015, pp. 485–489.
[20] A. Nizar, Z. Dong, Y. Wang, Power utility nontechnical loss analysis with
extreme learning machine method, IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 23 (3) (2008)
946–955.
[21] J. Nagi, K. Yap, S. Tiong, S. Ahmed, A. Mohammad, Detection of abnor-
malities and electricity theft using genetic support vector machines, in:
TENCON 2008-2008 IEEE Region 10 Conference, IEEE, 2008, pp. 1–6.
[22] S.S.S.R. Depuru, L. Wang, V. Devabhaktuni, Support vector machine based
data classification for detection of electricity theft, in: 2011 IEEE/PES Power
Systems Conference and Exposition, IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–8.
[23] A.A. Cárdenas, S. Amin, G. Schwartz, R. Dong, S. Sastry, A game theory
model for electricity theft detection and privacy-aware control in ami
systems, in: 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control, and Computing, Allerton, IEEE, 2012, pp. 1830–1837.
[24] C. Bandim, J. Alves, A. Pinto, F. Souza, M. Loureiro, C. Magalhaes, F. Galvez-
Dur, Identification of energy theft and tampered meters using a central
observer meter: a mathematical approach, in: 2003 IEEE PES Transmission
and Distribution Conference and Exposition (IEEE Cat. No. 03CH37495),
Vol. 1, IEEE, 2003, pp. 163–168.
14 D. Hock, M. Kappes and B. Ghita / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 21 (2020) 100290
[25] S. Salinas, M. Li, P. Li, Privacy-preserving energy theft detection in smart
grids: A p2p computing approach, IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 31 (9) (2013)
257–267.
[26] J.V. Spirić, M.B. Dočić, S.S. Stanković, Fraud detection in registered
electricity time series, Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst. 71 (2015) 42–50.
[27] D.I. Urbina, J.A. Giraldo, A.A. Cardenas, N.O. Tippenhauer, J. Valente, M.
Faisal, J. Ruths, R. Candell, H. Sandberg, Limiting the impact of stealthy
attacks on industrial control systems, in: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM,
2016, pp. 1092–1105.
[28] J. Bouché, D. Hock, M. Kappes, On the performance of anomaly detection
systems uncovering traffic mimicking covert channels, in: INC, 2016, pp.
19–24.
[29] D.E. Denning, An intrusion-detection model, Softw. Eng. IEEE Trans. 13 (2)
(1987) 222–232.
[30] Y. Zhang, N. Meratnia, P. Havinga, Outlier detection techniques for wireless
sensor networks: A survey, Commun. Surv. Tutor. 12 (2) (2010) 159–170.
[31] M. Xie, S. Han, B. Tian, S. Parvin, Anomaly detection in wireless sensor
networks: A survey, J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 34 (4) (2011) 1302–1325.
[32] H. Braun, S.T. Buddha, V. Krishnan, A. Spanias, C. Tepedelenlioglu, T. Yeider,
T. Takehara, Signal processing for fault detection in photovoltaic arrays, in:
Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2012 IEEE International
Conference on, IEEE, 2012, pp. 1681–1684.
[33] S. Dienst, J. Schmidt, S. Kühne, Case study: Condition assessment of a
photovoltaic power plant using change-point analysis, in: SMARTGREENS,
2013, pp. 159–164.
[34] S. McLaughlin, B. Holbert, A. Fawaz, R. Berthier, S. Zonouz, A multi-sensor
energy theft detection framework for advanced metering infrastructures,
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 31 (7) (2013) 1319–1330.
[35] M. Raciti, S. Nadjm-Tehrani, Embedded cyber-physical anomaly detection
in smart meters, in: Critical Information Infrastructures Security, Springer,
2013, pp. 34–45.
[36] B. Rossi, S. Chren, B. Buhnova, T. Pitner, Anomaly detection in smart grid
data: An experience report, in: 2016 Ieee International Conference on
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, smc, IEEE, 2016, pp. 002313–002318.
[37] L. Mookiah, C. Dean, W. Eberle, Graph-based anomaly detection on
smart grid data, in: The Thirtieth International Flairs Conference, 2017,
pp. 1–6.
[38] S.C. Yip, W.N. Tan, C. Tan, M.T. Gan, K. Wong, An anomaly detection
framework for identifying energy theft and defective meters in smart grids,
Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst. 101 (2018) 189–203.
[39] Z. Fengming, L. Shufang, G. Zhimin, W. Bo, T. Shiming, P. Mingming,
Anomaly detection in smart grid based on encoder–decoder framework
with recurrent neural network, J. China Univ. Posts Telecommun. 24 (6)
(2017) 67–73.
[40] T. Andrysiak, Ł. Saganowski, P. Kiedrowski, Anomaly detection in smart
metering infrastructure with the use of time series analysis, J. Sens. 2017
(2017).
[41] Y. Zhou, H. Zou, R. Arghandeh, W. Gu, C.J. Spanos, Non-parametric outliers
detection in multiple time series a case study: Power grid data analysis,
in: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018, pp. 1–8.
[42] J.S. Richman, J.R. Moorman, Physiological time-series analysis using ap-
proximate entropy and sample entropy, Am. J. Physiol. Heart Circ. Physiol.
278 (6) (2000) H2039–H2049.
[43] I. Vranken, J. Baudry, M. Aubinet, M. Visser, J. Bogaert, A review on the
use of entropy in landscape ecology: heterogeneity, unpredictability, scale
dependence and their links with thermodynamics, Landsc. Ecol. 30 (1)
(2015) 51–65.
[44] A. Wagner, B. Plattner, Entropy based worm and anomaly detection in
fast ip networks, in: 14th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling
Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprise, WETICE’05, IEEE,
2005, pp. 172–177.
[45] C.E. Shannon, A mathematical theory of communication, Bell Syst. Tech. J.
27 (3) (1948) 379–423.
[46] C. Beckel, W. Kleiminger, R. Cicchetti, T. Staake, S. Santini, The eco data
set and the performance of non-intrusive load monitoring algorithms,
in: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Embedded Systems for
Energy-Efficient Buildings, ACM, 2014, pp. 80–89.
[47] S. McLaughlin, B. Holbert, S. Zonouz, R. Berthier, Amids: A multi-sensor en-
ergy theft detection framework for advanced metering infrastructures, in:
2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications,
SmartGridComm, IEEE, 2012, pp. 354–359.
